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Conueyances of Land in Defraud of Creditors
in New York State.
By way of introduction to the treatment of this subject
I cannot, I think, do better than to make a brief ' quotation
from a paper by J,1r. John Reynolds of Brooklyn, read before
the New York State Bar Association, at its Third Annurl Meet
ing, held in the city of Albany, on the 13th day of Novem-
ber, 1879.
Kr. Reynolds says: NThe law governing fraudulent con-
veyances is as yet unsettle, and at the present day in a
forrnul , tive state. There is no rational ground for surprise
that this branch of the law should at this late day still
be unformed; on the contrary, it might be inferred,A RIORI,
that such must be the case. The theory on -vhich it rests
is a subtle one, and of late development in a.ny leahal system
This is well illustrated by the Boman Law.
The earliest remedies of creditors in a crude legal
system were al-,ays against the person and not the property
of the debtor. A btriking example of this is the "IN PART7S
SCAR~of the Roman Law. At Rome in certain cases, Lim deb-
tor might be taken and sold into slavery if he could not make
the necessary arrangements with his creditors for his re-
lease. I inally, the remedies against the person were taken
away, ani a complete system for annullihf fraudulent trans-
fers, and securing the debtors estate for creditors, was
provided, in LI3ErR 42 of the Digest of Justinian. The Law
of ngland in early times, by allowing imprisonment for debt
in all cases, at the o,tion of the creditor, effectually
operated IN T!RROR7iM against t.e debtors person, to prevent
fraudulent transfers; but its operation.was temporarily neut-
ralized to some extent, at an early stage of legal develop-
menit, by the protection against the arrest of :-btors ir
Sanctuaries". ence, arose a spasmodic and rrezatur crop
of fraudulent conveyances in "npland, far in advance of the
time for their normal, natural development. This occasioned
the passage of the statute 13th of 7lizabeth, and others,
a e "
and the adjudication of the Twyneaand others similar.
By the recent abolishment of imprisonment for debt, the
law no longer prevents fraudulent conveyances. They have
sprung up aroundj us in frightful numbers beyond all pre-
vious experience. Modern law, accordingly, has presented to
it ,that the early la* n.ver had, the rressing problem how to
neutralize the fraudulent transfers ,hich it has ceased to
prevent.
The greatest advances in the branch of the law w-hich
governs conveyances, have been made in modern cases, since
e abolishmnt of imprisornent for debt.. The advances al-
ready made by modern courts of Equity in neutralizing deb-
tors transfers aL fraudulent, are but stepping, stones to
further advances yet to come. This progress and tendency
is clearly marked and is universal. In nland and in all
of the states of this country. this policy is well recognized
-1 the courts. Of all the states, perhaps, New Jersey and
Alabama are at present the most advanced, but they simply
head tne universal march of t-e ,tates in this direction.
The policy of New York State in this matter has been
highly conservative . She has been one of the slowest to
respond to this universal tendency. This 7: ay be illustrat o d
by New York's repudiation of the great decision of Chancel-
lor Kent in Reade vs. Livingston. In New York there has
been a constant struggle arainst this conservative favori-
tism towards debtors;indeed, there was actually an open
quarrel between th1 e Supereme Court and the Court of Errors
on this matter. But since the T-hew York Court of Appeals
has succeeded to the Court of Errors, much stronger ground
has been taken. New Yori' has rapidly caught up with most of
the other states, and has recently z.ade marked advances, as
is shown by soe of the leading cases lately decided:
Carpenter vs. Roe;.(10 N.i., 227)
Savage vs. 'Kurphy, (34 N.Y., 508;)
Case vs. Phelps, (39 N. Y., 134;
Cole vs. Jialcolm, .(33 N.Y., 633;)"
I have made the above quotation (;4ith one or two inter-
polations), somewhat at length, because it gives in an ab-
breviated manner, a sketch of the development of the gener-
al doctrine, and of tne position NewYork has taken in the
premises, a freati deal beter than I could have hoped to
have done it.
New York State was, as is sucggested by the writer of
the a'o e i ot to
thaove iuotation, slow to lay down stringent rules tend-
ing toward the invalidation of conveyances in defraud of
cre'ditors. Chancellow Kent(in 2 Johns. Ch.,35)endeavored
to law down a strict rule. In this case he said, DIf the
deed is admitted t6 be fraudulent _n the part of the gran-
tor, there would be difficulty in allowing it to stand, ev-
en if the grantee were innocent of t'he fraud.
This case w s distinguished and an entirely different
rule laid down i:. the case of Viaterbury vs. Sturdevant, 18th
of Aend.,333, by Senator Edwards. In delivering the opinion
of the court, he says: "To render the conveyance fraudulent
and void, there should be fraudulent intent on the part of
the grantee, as well as the grantor. " This latter holding
though obviously too bread and too general in its statenent,
will I think, illustrate tne caution with -Aihich te 4ew
York courts dealt with this problem.
The Newv York Statutes though not differing essentially
from the English statute, nas some peculiarities. So I have
thought best to set out at length such parts of the ttatute
as pertain to the subject under consideration.
The provisions of tnis statute are found in sections
1,4 and 5 of Chapt-er VII, Title III, of the Revised Statutes,
and are as follows:
Section 1. 7very conveyance of assignment, in writing
or otherwise, of any estate of- interes-t in lands, made -Nith
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or otner per-
sons of their lawful suits, da.1aies, forfeitures,debts, or
de:-iands, shall be void.
Sec tion 4. The question of fraudulent intent, in all
cases arising under the provisions of this Chapter, shall
be deemed a question of fact and not of law: nor shall any
conveyance or charge be deemed fraudulent, as against credi-
tor- or purchasers, solely on the around that it .as not
founded on a valuable consideration.
The provisions of this Chapter shall not beSec tion 5.
construed in any maznner to affect or impair the title
of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless it shall
appear that such purchaser ha,- previous notice of the frau-
dulent intent of his inmediate frntor, or of the fraud ren-
dering void the title of such grantor.
Hefe to, we icy notice tLe reluctance of New York State
to lay down riles whereby to interfere with titles already
veted; section - of the statute was evidently enacted to
emphasize the rule, already existing, that bona fide purchas-
es for value were not to be eddled with, anid, it has been
claimed to make more plain the difference between voluntary
conveyances and those for value in the application of this
doctrine.
The principle upon which this le, islation is founded,
and towards which all courts are working, is , to luote from
. eynolds, "that ie entire property of ;vhi~h the debtor
is the real or beneficial owner, constitutes a fund which is
primarily applicable to the fullest extent of its entire
value, to the payments of its owners deb -s and that value
will not be allowed to be withdrawn from such primary ap-
plication, if any legal or equitable ground can be found, on
which to prevent such ithdra4l. "
'ith this principle in view, I shall endeavor to find
how th doctrine has been applied in this state, and to note
whether the courts have applied this principle to its full-
est extent in their adjudications.
Subject latter of the Conveyance.
In order tniat a conveyance kay ba set aside as fraudu-
lent, the subject liatter of the transfer nut be of such a
kind that it might have been applied by the creditor to the
pay:zent of his charge. The old "nglish law held that a
voluntary settlement of stocks, choses in action, of of copy
holds, or of any oth1Let property not liable to levy ai',J sale
on execution, wss not within the Statute of' lizabeth.
These have been included by a later statute however, an 4 the
only exception that I know of in this country, in tne way
of land, is tie Homestead estate. 1t ,,a been neld tLia. in-
asmuch as this estate is not liable to levy and sale under
an execution, that a transfer of it cannot be set aside as
in defraud of creditors. This appearb to be correct on
principle, for, if tle creditors, are not allowed to satisfy
their claims out of this pvoperty w"Lhile in the debtor's
inands, no injustice is done then by the transfer.
Xvvhat Creditors may take advantage
of a Fraudulent Conyeynce.
The benefits to be derived from th- statute are not
confined to creditors exiting at tne tiLe of the transfer,
but -ay extend to subsequent creditors, whose debts ha- not
been contracted at the time of the conveyance. But the
principle will not operate in favor of subsequent creditors,
unless it can be bno- n, that either tie vrantor -..ade thie
conveyance, with zactual intent to hinder, delay or defraud
persons who ri-Fht become creditors, (Case vs. Phelps, 39 N.. .,
134), or, tat 3fter the conveyance wes made, the grantor
had not sufficient :,eans. to pay his then existing debts, nor
reL, onable expectations tnat ne would have, in which case
the lw implies that the conveyance was made with intent to
defraud creditors, or, that there are debts unsatisfied
wvhich were due at the time of the conveyance.
Savage vs. Q,,urphy, 8 Bosw.,75;
If, at the time of bringing the action, no debt due
when the conveyance was made re.Lains unpaid, and there is
no evidence to show that the conveyance was :iaade with actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud subseiuent creditors, tife
conveyance must stand as against them.
If a conveyance is set aside as frau :!ulent against cred
itors existing at' 2 time, subsequent creditors are enti-
tied to participate in the application of the proceeds; but
10.
if antecedent creditors cannot make out a case, subsequent
crePditors cannot impeach it on account of the former prior
indebtedness. (Kerr on Fraud. )
In case of a voluntacy conveyance, a contemporaneous
creditor :, i.y have the conveyance set aside, by simply show-
ing that the. debtor did not retain a sufficient wmount of
propetrty to pay nii then', exictinC debts; a subseent cred-
itor, must, in connection with this fact, show tnat debts
exist-14wing alc time of the conveyance, have not been paid,
of, if they have been paid, that t '"-- was actual traudulent
intent on ti. part of the orantor, and probably, on the part
of the grantee, althought of this latter proposition, I am
uncertain. It is probable, however, that, if the vrante
was ignorant of t'e fraudulent intent of the rranvtor, and
nad put hiiSeif in such a position that it vould work injust
ice to him to have the conveyance set aside, he would be
protected, and the conveyance ,ould be allowed to stand. The
hractical difference betee . t e rights of contemporaneous
and subsequent creditors, as affecting voluntary conveyan-
ces, is, that it is not necessary tnat the former should
prove actual fraudulent intent in order to have a conveyance
set aside, while, in case of the latter, fraudulent inte n
will not be presumed, but must be proven as a matter of fact
Voluntary Conveyances.
A conveyance will not 1 adjudged fraudulent solely be-
cause voluntary. This is in accordance witn tCie statutory
provision, "No conveyance or char e shall be deemed fraud-
lent, as against creditors or purchisers, solely on t.he
cound th.!at it was not founded on a valuable consideration.
This rule is applied in the case of Dygert vs. Remerschnider
32 N.Y., 329. I. lhis case one Remerschnider, 1iho ;cs about
to marry, made an oral aC-reement -ith his intended "-ife, to
settle upon ner certain property after arriage. T.is being
an oral contract, was void and inoperative, and tne convey-
ancesubseuently made in pursuance of tnis agree.ent, vas a
voluntary settlement. A creditor of the h'ustand, 'gho had
beco::e such subseiuently to te a r ecent id to e
n= a .... t, but rior to -I--
conveyance, sought to have the conveyance set aside as frau-
dulent. The court held that a voluntary conveyance is not
P7R S' frau ulent, and thlat on trse fects only being shown.
the plaintiff could not recover.
Although the a,.sence of consideration is not conclusive
evidence of fraudulent intent, it is a circumstance that has
;reat effect in determining as to L)et..er t.±ere was or was
not such intent. (jackson vs. Peck 32 11. ., 329. )
_r"ji4:,noi
IlnICc as ti crantee in this class of cases, i not
a purchaser for value, he does not come within the protctio
of section b of tie statute, and hence, it is not ni2 cesary
to prove a fraudulent intent oii his part, in o,.r to inval-
idate the transfer. If the intent to defraud or circum-
stance8 ,vhich in lav amount to an intent to defraud, be
proven, on the part of the rrantor alone, th e law will re-
Fard this as sufficient cause for ceclaring tne conveyance
void and inoperative. ( .,Mohaw'k 3ank vs. At-,ater, 2 Paige, 9.
The learned Judge here says 'It is of no consequence,
whet 1 -2 the grantee knows of the state of tiie grantor's in-
debtedness or not. Lf the grantor committed a fraud upon
hiiis creditor, by giving a7way his property, which should have
been reservxed for them, the g rantee, without a valuable
consideration, cannot be protected, althought he was not
privy to the fraud:'
This may safely be said to be the law of this state to-
day, as the case is a leading one, and has been cited with
approtal in all the latLer cases in which this principle was
involved.
The reason for this rule is apparent. Persons who have
given credit to the debtor, relying on his property as a
security for their debt, have a right to expect that the
debtor will not dispose of it in such a way as to render it
highly improbable that their debt can be collected, should
he fzil to pay voluntarily. The grantee in such a convey-
ance loses nothing by being compelled to reconvey, as he has
given nothing for the property, while the rights of credi-
tors are at the same time protected.
The facts and circumstances from which fraudulent in-
tent will be implied, are numerous and varied. in fact, ill
the circumstances surrounding the transaction may be taken
into consideration. The very fact that the conveyance is
voluntary is strong evidence of intent to defraud, and if
the transfer leaves the grantor wit hout sufficient resources
with which to pay then existing debts, the conveyance is
presumed to have been fraudulent.
Carpenter vs. Roe, (10 N.Y., 227;)
Cole vs. Tyler, (35 N.Y., 73; )
Dwight , J.,. in delivering the opinion of the court,
in the case last above cited, says: 'lt is not necessary
that there should be an actual fraudulent intent. The re-
quisite fraud-may be inferred from the circumstances of the
case. It was at one time the law that a voluntary convey-
13.
anceL by one indebted was _.,, 3D fraudulent, as a iiiater of
law, towards his creditors; and no evidence ,as allowed to
rebut the presumption of fraud. "
Reade vs. Livingston, (3 Johns., Ch. -181. )
Fraudulent intent will E iso be presuwed where a volun-
tary conveyance is wde in anticipation of debt. Thus, when
a person executeb a voluntary conveyance, and then pay up
.I tin i.-debtedness by obtaining new credit and contract-
ing new liabilities, the transfer will be fraudulent and
void, even as to subsequent creditor., the courts holding
t1at the prior indebtedness has not been paid but simply
transferred. The case of Case vs. Phelps, (31 N.Y.,134), is
in point. here, a personu about to engage in a new business
for the purpose of securing his property for the benefit of
himself and fa .ily in the event, of loss, conveyed his prp-
erty to his wife, voluntarily an.d without consideration. The
conveyance was set aside as fraudulent and void, notwithstan-
ing the fact that it was distinctly found h-at the convey-
ance .,as made --,ithout any intention to defraud creditors
treR exis ting.
I shall not attempt to cive all the facts from w.hich
fraudulent intent ,wvill be infe.rred. Suffice it to say tiat
any and all circumstances tending to show that lie lrantor
conveyed away his property to get it beyond the reach of his

creditors, will be evicence of fraudulent intent.
Conveyances for Value.
HavinE diLcussed somewhat at length, the la-N 2, it ias
been aplled to conveyances volui.tary in their nature, the
question as to ho, it shall be applied to conveyances for a
valuable consideration demands so.-,e Zttention.
liection 2of the statute provides: 'Tne provision, of
t~i Chapter shall not be construed i ai:: manner to effect
or impair the titIA of a purchaser for a valuable considera-
tion, unless it shall appear that ,ucn purchaser had pre-
vious notice of txe fraudulent intent of his ii-.ediate grant
or- or of the frbud rendering void the title of such Frantor.
Thus we see that in order to be within the protection
of thi. section, the rantee uist >ve been a purchaser fo'r
a valua' le consideration, and in good faith. It is not suf-
ficient that the conveyance is for a va2juable consideration
OR in good faith; it must be both. Th concurrence of both
elements is essential and indespensible,(i2 Johnston, 320.1
Consideration for txLe Conveyance.
In order that a conveyance may be considered as having
been made for a valuable consideration, the 'pestion of ad-
equacy is not -aterial. Sutherland ,J., in Jackson vs.Peck,
(4 Vend, 30$.), says: "A voluntary conveyance is' iell def in-
ed to be a deed without any valuable consideration. The ad-
eiuacy of the consideration doeb not enter into the question
and only beco:,s tria1 as evidence of fraudulent intent.
The ,ole 'iues tion is wietu<:r anytiaing of vilue has passed
between the parties to the tranf er."
B3ut the consideration must be a lefgal one, and one that
the law -,ill recognize, or the transfer doe- not come within
tL po o the statute, and will tnierefore be conc;id-
u.Le protection o!t e si o ,
ered a voluntFry conveyance and will be subject to the rules
governing that kind of transfers. If the consideration is a
prior debt or obligation, it must, with a few exceptions,
however, be of such a kind as to be enforciAle at law.
(3 Barb. Ch., A4.)
The principki exception to the hat a conveyance
in pursuance of a, agreement rhlat cannot be enforced is
voluntary, is where there is a moral ol.ligation wiich cannot
be enforced on account of tixe provision of some statute.
The statute. of limitations is a statue that 1nay be waived,
and a debt barred by it, may be a good consideration for a
conveyance. This w~s held in the case of Iiaie vs. Stewart,
(7 Hun,591.) d&cided in 1876. The statute of frauds :nay al-
so be waived, and the debt :aay be paid by mieaos of a convey-
ance of property, which will be effectual as against credi-
tors.
The case of Liveri:-ore vs. .orthrup(14 N.Y.,l1O), -Ecb a
cabe where the grantor had made an oral agreement to be res-
ponsible for tlie debt of a~iother 'arson. In pursuance of
this acre.:_ent, he deeded certain property over to tae de-
tendant, which conveyance was atacked as fraudulent by
creditors of the grantor. r2he court, in delivering; the op-
inion, said: 'It is entir ly within the option of the deb-
tor -xlheter he w ill set up the statute of frauds against the
p-erformance of such a promise, or not, and althought the
promise was verbal, honesty, as well ac honor, required tnIat
it should be faithfully performed. "
A debt discharced by proceedings in bankruptcy may be
a good consideration, as against creditors, for a conveyance.
The reason for the rule is clear. Ahile the remedy has been
taken away by law, the moral obligation to pay the debt re-
mainsi and should the debtor choose to o so other creditors
cannot claim that their right have been invaded.
A debt discharged by voluntary release is not-,however,
a good consideration, for, the creditor having relinquished
17.
the debt itself, there is no moral obligation to pay it res
ing on the former debtor, and a conveyance in pursuance of
such a debt :is voluntary.
Bona Fides of the Transfer.
In order tiat a conveyance may stan , as against credi-
tors of the grantor, the contract must have been entered in-
to in absolute good faith on the part of t! grntee. it
.:.aJes no ditference -. iat might have been the intention of
t... -rantor, if the <grantee is free from any imputation of
fraud or mala fides, he will be protected.
In the early history of the doctrine, some confusion
seems to have arisen from the very general way is which the
courts stated tne law. The distinction between voluntary
conveyances and conveyances for vLlue, in ta ap,,>Jication of
this doctiine, does not seem to have been fully made, until
the case of Dart vs. Far:nuer's Bank(27 Barb. ) was decided.
The distinction as here made, is that rwjtuality of intent to
defraud, on the part of grantor and Frantee is not necessary
to render void a voluntary conveyance by a debtor, while, if
the conveyance be for a valuable consideration, such 1utual-
ity " is essential.
W ith this principle or distinction ii view,
nearly all of' the apparently conflicting decisions can be
harmonized.
Absolute mala fides however, need not be prove, by the
creditors when attempting to set aside a conveyance as
fraudule:nt. As a r:nral rule, it may be said, tnat if the
purcase be made by a person having knowledge of the fraudu-
lentLt.nt of the gr ntor, or, such knwoledge as ought
reasonably to have put him on inquiry, and such inquiry
'vould have disclosed the fraudulent intent of the grantor,
he is not entitled to protection, even though he bought in a
actual good faith, with no intent to defraud and for a v.-
liable consideration. The hearty copperation of every member
01 society, to lend his aid in discountenancing fraudulent
practices, is due to the social body of which 1.e is a member,
anti, if he is nepligent in the exercise of this obligation,
he alone :ust suffer by his default.
The rule as above given has perhaps one exception, that
of transfers to creditors in Jischar{Fe of- prior indebtedness.
If there is no actual fraud on the part of the creditor, the
courts will uphold tie transfer, even though the grantee
knew of trhe fraudulent intent of the grantor. It nas been
so held, even Nwhere the debt has been barred by tne statu-te
of limi ta tion .
The doctrine that a creitor is not charged with notice
of his grantor'b fr'aud, Las been liiited to cases -iihere t1le
debt was the s ole consideration for the transfer. v'', e the
conveys'nce is for tne joint purpose of paying an ii-debted- .es
and of puting tLe grantor's properly beyond tlie r Lc' of
other creditors, it -ill be void, as fr~ujul,,t, except as to
the -:,.ount of tIe actual indebtedness.
Cohen vs. Kelly, (35 'uper. Ct. Rep. )
1len vs. 3ushnell, (1 Hun, 319)
58 Barb., 339;
12 Hun, 303.
Vith this one restriction, a creditor is alw eys at lib-
erty to receive property from his debtor in payment of Jiis
debt; It is not ipso facto a fraudulent act to prefer one
creditor over another.
14 Hun, 172;
4 Denio, 113;
1- VVend., 237;
It has been held that a conveyance alsolute on its
face, but intentded as security for a debt to a bona fide
creditor is not fraudulent a& to other creditors.
Riguey vs. Talmage, (17 iow. r., L)&3)
The question of bona fides is a iues-tion of fact and
all the circumstances of the transaction will be considered
in rendering a decision. The adequacy or inadequacy of the
consideration is sometimes tae controlling question;if the
consideration is Frossly inadequate, the conveyance will be
set aside.
Burden of Proof.
If the vendor retains possession of tne property, a
presuaption of fraud arises, anr, the ONUS is on the vendee
to show from the circumstances of the case that there is no
froud.
iill's Ch.,32C.
In cases of voluntary conveyances, the burden is on the
,onee to show that, at the time t making -I gitt, the do-
nor was solvent and retained sufficient property to pay his
then existing de ts.
8 Cowen, 403;
15 Wend., 683;
2-1 N.Yf., 623;
Where the conveyance is in the form of an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, the burden of proof is on the
contesting creditors, to prove tnat the assig7nment was con-
trary to law and fraudulent, or that the assignor is sol-
ven t.
If the conveyance is founded on a v:luable considera-
tion, the ONUS is on those 4ho seek its impeachment. An im-
portant case on this subject is the case of Newman vs. Cor-
dell(-13 Barb.,448), where it is said: 'The rule is well
settled, that, to, make a conveyance fraudulent , fraud, or
fraudulent intent must be shown on the part of the cant:e
as w 1 as the grantor. Vvhere conveyances are attacked for
fraud, and there are many facts and circu:.stances surround-
inr Lne case which cast a suspicion upon the transaction,
the defendants should be prepard to ::1eet the allegations
of unfairness; and it they fail to do ,o, Lie plaintitf will
be entitled to tae benefit of all of the unfavorable infer-
ences iich iay legit imately be drawn from their neglect and
the generl featur- of the case. The denial of a party
charged with fraud that tnere was any intention to defraud
the plaintiff can scarcely be considered a, anything more
than an expression of opinion of th: party charged with
fraud, as to the character of the transaction, and his own
estimate of it. V.hile the party alleging fraud is bound to
prove it by sufficient evidence, it is not necessary that it
shoul,4 be established by direct and positive proof; resort
may be had to circumstantial evidence."'
The teindency of the courts of this state, as shown by
tne case last above cited, is toward the full realization
of the principle th.at a debtor's pro~erty is a trust fund
for the benefit of nis creditors,and that any attempt to de-
plete ' is fund will be rendefed ineffectual, so far s i-ay
be consistent with the rights of third persons,who have,
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through no fault of their own, been made parties to the deb-
tor's fraud. The courts of New York, though at first apply-
ing this doctrine very sparingly, an, even then reluctantly,
are eagerly striving for tie lead:.rship in this, the univer-
sal march against fraudulent practices in the affairs of
bus ine ss.
